CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5.pdf

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5 my a a SECRET 50X1-HUM | “ 50X1-HUM SELECTED REACTIONS OF SATELLITE OFFICIALS FOLLOWING THE STALIN DENIGRATION JUNE 1956-JUNE 1957 50X1-HUM SECRET . 50X1-HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5 SECRET 50X1-HUM rs ¥ / SELECTED REACTIONS OF SATELLITE OFFICIALS FOLLOWING THE STALIN DENIGRATION , JUNE 1956 - JUNE 1951 / SECRET 50X1-HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5 SECRET 50X1-HUM I, -Introduction and Summary .A, This study was undertaken to gauge the extent of personal crisis, confusion, ard disorientation among representative Satellite officials and Communist party members residing outside the Orbit that resulted from the Stalin denigration. Of primary:concern are the individual reactions of prominent party members to statements made by Khrushchev and Mikoyan during the 20th CPSU Congress in February, 1956, and to the "secret" Khrushchev report that w…

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5 SECRET _ 50X1-HUM E. Satellite party officials confirmed the deplorable economic status that their leaders had created. After twelve years of power, these officials appeared in unanimous agreement that living condi- tions had:not been significantly improved; the period had been charac-~ terized ‘by low wages and poor working conditions, and tremendous capital expansion had resulted in continuous shortage of basic.con- sumer goods. Their condemnation of party leaders was not based on any profo…

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5 SECRET 50X1-HUM more and better goods and to break the present economic deadlock. G. Nevertheless, reactions offer little evidence that a large number of party members were abandoning the Communist ideology  ? and turning to capitalism for galvation. Particularly. among the cadre members, there was still a blind faith in the basic soundness of Communist ideology. Privately they still maintained that they must remain blood enemies of the West, even though they were forced to show the outward f…

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5 SECRET. 50X1-HUM ship that tolerated no criticism of his policies. In the end, he had . so arranged and manipulated everything that he was either feared or worshipped by everyone. No one dared to offend his vanity, question his wisdom, or offer criticism. He was protected from all unfavorable criticism, to the point that he became isolated ina ca world of his own. In this world he lost contact not only with the masses,: but even with his own Party. Science was distorted to meet his approval, …

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5 SECRET. 50X1-HUM II. Bulgarian Reactions The following summaries and conclusions are based on a selection of conversations among members of a Bulgarian economic - mission abroad. ‘These conversations took place during the period 4 April 1956 to 15 May 1957, and represent views and opinions expressed by middle echelon Bulgarian Communist Party members on the existing economic situation and events following the 20th CPSU Congress in Moscow. For purposes of analysis, conversa- tions are summariz…

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/31 : CIA-RDP80T00246A073800520001-5 SECRET 50X1-HUM A, From 4 April to 21 April 1956 1. The conversations clearly indicated that, for the most part, members of the Bulgarian mission were not very well informed on | the political events taking place in Bulgaria. Their primary source “4 of information appeared to be Western newspapers, particularly. leftist French, Italian, and Swiss,. Yugoslav newspapers, visiting members of other missions, and occasional reports which were sent to the lega tion through diplomatic channels. Thei…