FY2006_1Q_IOB_REPORT.PDF

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 
FORT GEORGE G . MEADE, M.ARYLANO 20755~000 
28 February 2006 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD 
THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) 
SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA 
Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 
. 
(U//FOUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or 
otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any intelligence 
activities of the…

DOCID: 4165194 
'l='eP SECRETNCOMJ~H/1'f>tOFOR~U/20""7'1129 
1. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES 
a. ~GNOfT"During this quarter, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed 
various intelligence activities of the National Security Agency/Central Security 
Service (NSA/CSS) to determine whether they were conducted in accordance with 
applicable statutes, Executive Orders (E.0.s), Attorney General (AG) procedures, 
and Department of Defense (DoD) and internal directives. With few exceptions, the 
issues presented were routine and indicated that the operating elements 
understand the restricti…

DOCID: 4165194 
I OP SECRETllCOMll~Tm<10FOltI~771030l 11~ 
the site violated intelligence oversight procedures. 
with.out submitting a test plan for review ¢.d·· 
'-:a:-::p:-::p:-:::r~ov=r-r::y~r:-e::""""llC:~lr"'7r'~:"O""T"'~c'.:".e=-o"::'T":~enerafCounsel..(QGC). Other weaknessea::\iV'ere 
found in training and program management. NSA/CSS ·otG\villmon.jtor t9~/ 
deficiencies through correction. 
. .. ·:::::::>\t?.l ( 3 > - P . L . 8 6- 3 6 
· ....... . 
mspect10n o t 
Action has been completed to rectify the weakness in its training program, which 
has been amended to provide intelligence ov…

·. DOC.ID: 4165194 
TOP SECRETHCOMH4"'f//1qO:FOftl<l/i~~361 12~ 
b. (&'/SI) The_AG ~anted authority to collect the communications ?-fou.s. 
persons overseas dunng this quarter. 
. . ....-· 
... ·· 
,./ ( b ) (1) 
... ...-:::·>-" 
(b ) (3) - P . L . 
(2) (U) Unintentional 
... ·· ..... ··" 
..... ··" 
a. (&4£811/NP) This quarter, there wereOinst~ee~·"in which analysts 
inadvertently collected communications to, from, or _about U.S. persons while 
pursuing foreign intelligence tasking. All of the _jnC'idents were reported to 
responsible oversight officials, and corrective .. .actions were taken…

' . DOC.ID: 4165194 
·1 OP SECRE'fh'COMBffh'f~OfORH//26,<11 lz~ 
. 
~. 
. ..... 
.. ... 
7.2.c 
Necessary 
7.2.c.l Foreign Official 
. ,..·.· ... "":: .. ·.·' :. 
: .. 
,, .. _ .· 
. 
7.2.c.3 International Narcotics 
7 .2.c.4 Criminal Activity 
7.2.c.7 U.S. Government Official 
.. ·· 
.... ·· 
....... ·· 
...... ··· 
....... ·· 
" ,, 
.. ·· 
...... 
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·~ b l ( 1) 
(b}-(3l - P. 
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(b l c"H.~ 50 'm!T.....-r,~r;-1-,..--------------'-_,__----------
,..-..... .,... . .....__ _____ ___,_. 
TOTAL 
... . . .. .. · · .... . . ... . . :::::::::::::::::}'·.;~·~ ~ i ~ ~ -P . L . 8 6-3 6 
••··••…

DOCID: 4165194 
I OP SECR'.ET/7COMfl<l'fm<IOf0RtqH203fH 129 
\bl (3) - P. L. 86- 36 
uarter included re resentatives of th 
.{:o'l < l l 
4. (U) Other Activities 
'(b)(.1) 
.. ··<"<bIJ3l - P. L. 86- 36 
....-::...-
(bf{3l - 18 USC 798 
... ...- ./ 
(bl\(3l - 50 USC 3024 (il 
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: ·. 
a. (U//FOl:JO) FISA Incidents 
(b)(3J~P,L 86-36 
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.··" 
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(1) ('fS//SJ// ~JF) Human error allowed collection···to· ~(fntin.u{four days past\the 
expiration of a FISA authorization 
·· ... / Prior to the expiratiOn, 
an NSA analy…

DOC.ID: 4165194 
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'ft'.'fP SECltE'ff/COMHq"f/1NOFOT<1q77203U 1129 ......... ······ -~bl < l l 
t~ .. l ( 3°)'.;;J~,JJSC 798 
. 
.. ..... :::"·:. 
(b.· ... ~···.(·· .. 3l - P. L. 86- 36 
();> i"-1 3 i - s0:::·ii~c.,,) o 2 4 ( i i 
· · · · · · .. . . ... 
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... . 
··· .. :::::::::::·(~t~rf@t(Sl/fliF)I 
. ····· 
... ::Jwlj,ll~:~ci~~~~ting a baseline re:yiew of a 
tar et bec·aU:$~::-0f.increased activ.i.ty, .. an:_.J.'ISA .. analyst noticed.that! .... _______ 
..... 
··· ...... ·····....... · ... we.re JJnfami}iar:····Extensive research le…

DOC! 1'},h ;i,i4165194 
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. 
(b;~ (3')'"-:~:-L. · 86- 36 
~~~:~:: ~:;:~h;PS:l:::::::~:::;::?:l~;:=.1 > '"'''.':' ; 
......... ________ __. ttfsked the0telephone nu~befs without knowing that 
the n~m~e~s were unintentionally omitc~...the 
.. new court order applica~ion . It 
wasn t un~i.!:) 
I that the 
earned that new court order did not 
contain thLJiumbers. The resulting m ercept was immediately destroyed, and 
no reports were issued based on that unauthorized intercept. A review of the 
procedures for implementing a signed court order was conducted to isolate any 
process weakness and to…