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CY2007_ANNUAL_IOB_REPORT.PDF
NSA·UFO_FOIA·pdf·1.7 MB·9 pages
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DOCID: 4165172 NATiONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE F'C>RT GEORGF.: G. MEA.OE, MARYLAND 20755-6000 It\ 29 February 2007 - This date is incorrect and should read 29 February 2008. MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT) SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Required Actions for the CY 2007 Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress-·· INFORMATlON MEMORANDUM (U/TOUO) Jn accordance with your memorandum of 15 November 2007, the enclosed consolidation of the National Security Agency's Quarterly Reports to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board…
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DOCID: 4165172
'ff\P ~~G{ET//COMl?iT/:l'iOrORH'/20320 J 08
1. (Uf/FOUO) Intelligence, counterintemgence, and intelligence-related activities
that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarte r~ as well as
any actions taken as a result of the violations.
(U) lntemgence Activities
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... /
(b) (3) - P. L . 86- 36
...............
(T81/8±/!H.EL 'FO u;Ji(. F'VEY) Unintentional collection against United States (U.S.)
persons. On0
·6ccasions Signals InteHig<mce (SIGINT) analysts inadvertently
collected communications to, from, or about U.S. persons while pursu…page 2
DOCID: 4165172 TOP ~5LCR.[T, 1C0.l'vllH 'L/NOrORJ~;,-2tt~te1 ()8 .................... < .. b .... l ... (.I"l ....... I ....................................... - (b) (3) . ......................................... . 1.....-----1, ..................................... . (bl (3l - 18 USC 798 (bl (3l - 50 USC 3024 (il EEW8± ( 'EH3'.b Cfl0 BS • pnt;n• A . T k Th 1 - .c h f:C d 11 . " 117: H, :: v .:: 1) . ct10n a en. . e se ectors 1or t ea: .lecte co ection were detasked from selection management systems used to manage and task ........................ .. selectors on collect…
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DOCID: 416517 2
TOP 8ECRfT//CO~ m ··r:woFOR}~;;9(fl90 1 0'8· ... ·•"'""''"" .... (b) (l)
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(b) (3) - P. L. 86- 36
······ ·······:::::::::: ....... .
('I'D//Di//~clF) FlSA dissemination. I
1 1?'.!Jhii~ii~~d··;~~ort-s were cancelled because
they contained the i<l<mtities of U.$., .pe:r.s()ns, organizations, or entities.
Additionally, there werel
!instances of improper dissemination of unevaluated,
unminimized SIGINT derived from court-approved collection. In the first instance,
an analyst sent unminimized NSA FISA-derived communication…page 4
DOCID: 416517 2
TOP SECRET,'/COM.IHT/:HOfOH:Ni:28320108
were disabled and thf;y received remedial training concerning the proper use of
databases.
(U) Misuse of the U.S. SIGINT System
.. The instructor
L--------.---.,....--,....---........ ---....,,..,,.,,,.....-,....-~~--~---~
was counseled on the restrictions on NSA authorities and was mandated to attend
training on USSID SP0018, which he comph~ted in July 2007.
::::::::::" ,,,,,,,. ........... ······~e.~ rn - P. L .
86
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36
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0:}}.,{3) - 50 USC 3024 {i)
{bY· .. t}l - 18 USC 798
(8//Si//ttF)…page 5
DOCID : 4165172 (U//f"OUO) NSA/CSS Georgia. NSA/CSS Georgia has made significant improvements in its intelligence oversight progran1. The progTam management function was transferred to the operations staff from the security clirectorate. NSNCSS Georgia has implemented a process to track intelligence oversight training for newly arrived employees by using computer account creation information. Advanced intelligence oversight training on United States Signals Intelligence Dir<~ctive SIGINT Policy 0018 (USSID SP0018) and the FISA was created for operations watch officers to provide more i…
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........................................... ······· ········· ......................................................................................................... Cb) (1) (bl (3) - P. L. 86- 36 3. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS Intelligence Oversight Program. (8//0I//~tF) Practicing due diligencH. NSA has im roved internal controls to r d c the risk of unauthorized collection. "(bl (1) (bl (3l - P. L. 86- 36 (bl (3l - 50 USC 3024 (il 4. (U) Changes to NSAICSS published directives or policies concerning intemgence, counterintemgence, or intelligence-related activities an…
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DOCID: 4165172 'HW ~~CRCf1,COMl?~ 'f'JNOf'OR:H:t20326t0ti detm:-inine whether NSA .. ···" .· ·· : The re\1iew did not find a pattern of errors, exaggeration of facts, or ~n51 intentional misstatements by NSAI I_... ................. .. ··········· 86- 36 L--------------------------------ri::"'l""r.l"l""="'l"'~c 798 (bl (3l - 50 USC 3024 (il . - -- ....._ I ] (Ull .1. \. . .1\.5\_) I I : r::.:.:..::;....;:;;;..::::..;~L----------------------------, \bil bl 3l - P. L. 86- 36 .............. (C#tffr') Retention of Domestic Communications Collected Under FISA Surveillances. ·w…
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