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CY2007_ANNUAL_IOB_REPORT.PDF

NSA·UFO_FOIA·pdf·1.7 MB·9 pages

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DOCID: 4165172 
NATiONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 
F'C>RT GEORGF.: G. MEA.OE, MARYLAND 20755-6000 
It\ 29 February 2007 
-
This date is 
incorrect and 
should read 29 
February 2008. 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT) 
SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Required Actions for the CY 2007 Intelligence Oversight Report to 
Congress-·· INFORMATlON MEMORANDUM 
(U/TOUO) Jn accordance with your memorandum of 15 November 2007, the enclosed 
consolidation of the National Security Agency's Quarterly Reports to the President's Intelligence 
Oversight Board
page 1
DOCID: 4165172 
'ff\P ~~G{ET//COMl?iT/:l'iOrORH'/20320 J 08 
1. (Uf/FOUO) Intelligence, counterintemgence, and intelligence-related activities 
that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarte r~ as well as 
any actions taken as a result of the violations. 
(U) lntemgence Activities 
./cb> <1> 
... / 
(b) (3) - P. L . 86- 36 
............... 
(T81/8±/!H.EL 'FO u;Ji(. F'VEY) Unintentional collection against United States (U.S.) 
persons. On0
·6ccasions Signals InteHig<mce (SIGINT) analysts inadvertently 
collected communications to, from, or about U.S. persons while pursu
page 2
DOCID: 4165172 
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selectors on collect
page 3
DOCID: 416517 2 
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('I'D//Di//~clF) FlSA dissemination. I 
1 1?'.!Jhii~ii~~d··;~~ort-s were cancelled because 
they contained the i<l<mtities of U.$., .pe:r.s()ns, organizations, or entities. 
Additionally, there werel 
!instances of improper dissemination of unevaluated, 
unminimized SIGINT derived from court-approved collection. In the first instance, 
an analyst sent unminimized NSA FISA-derived communication
page 4
DOCID: 416517 2 
TOP SECRET,'/COM.IHT/:HOfOH:Ni:28320108 
were disabled and thf;y received remedial training concerning the proper use of 
databases. 
(U) Misuse of the U.S. SIGINT System 
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was counseled on the restrictions on NSA authorities and was mandated to attend 
training on USSID SP0018, which he comph~ted in July 2007. 
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page 5
DOCID : 4165172 
(U//f"OUO) NSA/CSS Georgia. NSA/CSS Georgia has made significant 
improvements in its intelligence oversight progran1. The progTam management 
function was transferred to the operations staff from the security clirectorate. 
NSNCSS Georgia has implemented a process to track intelligence oversight training 
for newly arrived employees by using computer account creation information. 
Advanced intelligence oversight training on United States Signals Intelligence 
Dir<~ctive SIGINT Policy 0018 (USSID SP0018) and the FISA was created for 
operations watch officers to provide more i
page 6
........................................... 
······· ········· 
......................................................................................................... Cb) (1) 
(bl (3) - P. L. 86- 36 
3. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS Intelligence Oversight Program. 
(8//0I//~tF) Practicing due diligencH. NSA has im roved internal controls to r d c 
the risk of unauthorized collection. 
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(bl (3l - P. L. 86- 36 
(bl (3l - 50 USC 3024 (il 
4. (U) Changes to NSAICSS published directives or policies concerning 
intemgence, counterintemgence, or intelligence-related activities an
page 7
DOCID: 4165172 
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detm:-inine whether NSA 
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did not find a pattern of errors, exaggeration of facts, or ~n51 intentional 
misstatements by NSAI 
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(C#tffr') Retention of Domestic Communications Collected Under FISA 
Surveillances. ·w

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