CIA-RDP79R01012A003900020012-6.pdf

| Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ENTIAL CIA-RDP79R01012A003900020012-6 LW - CODMTTEFN = . y>  CENTBAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 15 damary 1954 MMCRANDU FOR: Me, Aten Bane (OR) Colenst Wo H, Hennig, USA (G2) Captain Allan L, Reed, USN (ONT) Gelonel Charles F. Gillis a (APoTe-282) Captain Ray Malpass, USN SUBJECT 8 HIE; Rebable Develoneente in Bart Germany through 19 1, fhe attached draft estimate fe forwarded for yaview. 2. Tt 4s requested that your representative meet with us for a clean-up session at 2:00 Fridey, ad Janmaxy » pe) Room 146 South Building. 25X1 DOCUMENT No…

. — Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15 : NR  oROTOT2A008900020012-6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 15 January 1954 SUBJECT: NIE=-9h: PROBABIE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1955 TRE PROBLEM To estimate the current situation and probable developnents in East Germany through 1955. CONCLUSIONS | 1. We believe that in the present context of the East-West struggle the USSR regards ite control over East Germany ag essential both to the pursuit of ite aims in Germany and to the security of the Hes. For the period of this estimate, it is highly unlikely that the K…

' M—n, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15 : CR ROTO T2A005900020012-8 . J SECRET 2. We believe that the USSR can with its present controls @ount on the continued subservience of a native regime in Eastern Germany, Although the vast majority of the population is die- affected, outbreaks of popular resistance of sufficient magnitude to endanger the regime are unlikely so long as Soviet forces are present in sufficient strength to lend support to the local security forces, 3. So long as the USSR still hopes to prevent the rearmament of West Germany in alliance w…

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A003900020012-6 pa) . SECRET for termination of reparations and the return of Soviet-owmed enterprises to East German control probably represents a decision to reduce the immediate diversion of East German resources to Soviet use in the interest of the longer-term build-up of the econany. However, the USSR will retain direct control of uranium mining operations; these now provide approximately 50 percent of Hloe production of uranium ore and probably are an important factor in the USSR's determination to ret…

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15 : CIN ey | 8010728008900020012-8 DISCUSS LON Sn SRMANY IN SWIET POLICY 6. Since 1945 Bast Germany has been an important element iu the tote Soviet power position relative ta that, of the Yest fhe occupation of Kast Germany has ensbled the USSR to retain an edvenced military position in the heart of Surope. Rast Germany hes provided the Bloc economy with substantial econemic assets, particularly in key industrial gocda. It hes given Communist power @ political bridgehead from which to pursue ite aim of subjugating G1 Germany,…

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15 : CIA Rey ROTO T2nqoggq0020018 * SECRET control of a reunified Germany.2/ We do believe that the Kremlia now expects that either of these conditions bas any prospect of early realization. For the period of ehis ontinate, therefors, it is aed walikely thet the Kremlin will undertake policies or accept proposals vhich vould enfenger ite control of Bast Germeny.2/ WULE Ropabiied/ 8. Sines the establishment of the Germeny Damoce (car) in 1949, the USSR has reduest ite overt contro), mechandems parent independence of the local we…

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15 : CIA Rp oto tzA00s900020012°8 SECRET ‘ta West Germany end ce) give the GOR the appearence of equality with ; the Petaral Republte eo = epotasin for Gontin option. The Bast S nevertheless unter effective Soviet control with respect te all ites major political ead ccumpate actions. professionals long 1 ia Soviet service. We believe thet the USER eae , “we ghe cine Ret German rusia partie , whieh exe tatutediie for ahow-viniow purposes : costed over non-Cdummnist eoguents of the population. iad mea = ships are sunl2 ond their …

aa ; Cele in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/15 : CIA RDP FOROTO12A003900020012-6 SECHET @ portion of the youth. Anti-Russien sentiment, desire for @ ree unification of Germany, continuing contacts with the West, and the lov-sesle of living coubine to keep the vest majority of the population disaffected. Deapite the regime's efforts to improve economic conditions, it is unlikely that esy large part of the of the Communist cause. 12. On the other hand, 1% is almost certein thet a widely organized resistance capeble of open opposition to the regime does not exist. The open res…