DODIG-2023-109_Unclassified_Summary_UAP_Secure.pdf

Inspector General 
U.S. Department of Defense
INTEGRITY  INDEPENDENCE  EXCELLENCE
Unclassified Summary of 
Report No. DODIG-2023-109, 
“Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions 
Regarding Unidentified Anomalous 
Phenomena,” August 15, 2023
J A N UA R Y  2 4 ,  2 0 2 4

II │ 
NOTE:  A classified version of the Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions Regarding 
Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena formed the basis of the unclassified summary.

│ 1
Historical Background
Over the past decades, the DoD has initiated infrequent and inconclusive efforts to identify 
and understand the origin, capabilities, and intent of unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP).  
Military pilots have historically reported many of the reported UAP sightings.  Also, the 
Air Force and Navy have been at the forefront of developing policies, procedures, and 
mechanisms for reporting UAP.  In fact, the DoD has relied heavily on the Services and 
Components to detect, report, collect, analyze, and identify UAP since the 1940s.
The DoD’s first official UAP-focused a…

2 │ 
Introduction
Objective
The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD, Military Services, 
Defense agencies, and Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations (MDCOs) took 
intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection actions to detect, report, collect, analyze, 
and identify unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP).  
Background
The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) defined UAP as “unidentified 
anomalous phenomena,” which include:  (a) airborne objects that are not immediately 
identifiable, (b) transmedium objects or devic…

│ 3
In response to Congress’ concerns, in August 2020 the DoD established a UAP Task 
Force (UAPTF) to develop standardized reporting requirements for UAP encounters.  In 
June 2021, the UAPTF and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued the 
congressionally mandated Preliminary Assessment on UAP, which stated that UAP reporting 
data are largely inconclusive, as well as a consolidation of reports across the U.S. Government is 
inconsistent.  Moreover, the Preliminary Assessment on UAP stated that standardized reporting, 
increased collection and analysis, and a streamlined p…

4 │ 
Presidential and DoD Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Force 
Protection Policies
The following Presidential and DoD policies establish requirements for intelligence gathering, 
counterintelligence, force protection, and civil liberty protection.6 
Executive Orders
Executive Order 12333 states that the DoD may conduct counterintelligence activities in 
support of DoD Components within the United States.7  In addition, Executive Order 12333 
identifies that the DoD may use intelligence component offices for the collection of specialized 
intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
D…

│ 5
The DoD Does Not Have a Comprehensive, Coordinated 
Approach to Address UAP
We reviewed the DoD’s policies, procedures, and actions for detecting, reporting, collecting, 
analyzing, and identifying UAP and determined that, among other things:
•	
the DoD has not used a coordinated approach to detect, report, collect, analyze, and 
identify UAP; 
•	
DoD Components have largely excluded geographic combatant commands, which are 
responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing threats and attacks against the 
United States and its territories, possessions, and bases in their respective are…

6 │ 
DoD Components Developed Varying Processes to Detect and Report 
UAP Incidents
The FY 2022 NDAA assigns AARO, under the OUSD(I&S), responsibility for synchronizing 
and standardizing the collection, analysis, and identification of UAP incidents.  However, 
the DoD has not yet issued comprehensive UAP guidance.  In the absence of DoD-level 
guidance, the DoD Components have developed varying informal processes to detect and 
report UAP incidents.  For example, an Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Airborne 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Technical Advisor stated that t…